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To what extent does a tax credit aﬀect ﬁrms’ R&D activity? What are the mechanisms?
This paper examines the eﬀect of the 2003 Japanese tax credit reform on ﬁrms’ R&D in-
vestment by exploiting cross-sectional variation across ﬁrms in the changes in the eﬀective
tax credit rate between 2002 and 2003. When we use the benchmark sample to estimate
the ﬁrst-diﬀerence equation between 2002 and 2003, our estimate for the elasticity of R&D
investment with respect to the eﬀective tax credit rate is 2.05% with a standard error of 0.60,
and the estimated eﬀect of the R&D tax credit on R&D investment is signiﬁcantly larger
for small ﬁrms with relatively large outstanding debts. When we use diﬀerent methods and
diﬀerent samples, we ﬁnd mixed evidence for the positive eﬀect of the R&D tax credit, but
an interaction term between the eﬀective tax credit rate and the debt-to-asset ratio is always
estimated to be signiﬁcant for small ﬁrms, providing robust evidence for the role of ﬁnancial
constraint in determining the eﬀect of the R&D tax credit.
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comments.1 Introduction
To what extent does a tax credit aﬀect ﬁrms’ R&D activity? What are the mechanisms? Because
R&D has some characteristics of a public good, government subsidies of R&D investment could
be justiﬁable to bridge the gap between the private and social rates of return. Furthermore,
R&D investment plays an important role in long-run economic growth (Romer (1986) and Aghion
and Howitt (1998)). Therefore, understanding the mechanisms through which tax policies aﬀect
R&D investment is a prerequisite for designing eﬀective growth-promoting tax policies.
Proprietary information, highly uncertain returns, and a lack of collateral value for R&D cap-
ital may hinder the ability to ﬁnance R&D investment with external funds (see Arrow (1962)).1
When ﬁrms do not hold suﬃcient internal funds, R&D investment may be restricted by ﬁnancial
constraint. From this perspective, a tax credit may promote R&D investment not only by in-
creasing the private return from R&D investment but also by relaxing the ﬁnancial constraint on
R&D expenditure. While a small number of empirical studies provide micro-level evidence for
the ﬁnancial constraint of R&D investment (see Hall (2002), Himmelberg and Petersen (1994),
and Brown et al. (2009)), few empirical studies directly examine the eﬀect of tax credit pol-
icy changes on ﬁrms’ R&D investment and quantify the importance of ﬁnancial constraints to
explain the policy eﬀect on R&D investment. The present paper ﬁlls this gap by empirically
examining the eﬀect of the 2003 Japanese tax credit reform on ﬁrms’ R&D expenditure using
the panel data of Japanese manufacturing ﬁrms.
Estimating the eﬀect of R&D tax credit policy is often diﬃcult because, typically, the same
R&D tax credit rate uniformly applies to all ﬁrms, and hence, there is no variation across ﬁrms
to identify the eﬀect of R&D tax credit policy on R&D expenditure. The 2003 Japanese tax
credit reform provides an interesting case in which the changes in the eﬀective tax credit rate
are not uniform across ﬁrms. In the 2003 tax reform, the Japanese government introduced a
total tax credit system under which the aggregate tax credit was substantially larger than it had
been under the incremental tax credit system that was in eﬀect until 2002. In the incremental
system, ﬁrms can apply for the tax credit only if R&D expenditure in the current accounting
year is greater than the average of the three largest yearly R&D expenditures from the previous
ﬁve years. In the total tax credit system, the tax credit is applied on total R&D expenditure,
independent of previous R&D expenditures. Because the tax credit depends on past R&D
expenditure under the incremental system, but is independent of a ﬁrm’s R&D history under
the total tax credit system, changes in the eﬀective tax credit rate due to the 2003 reform vary
across ﬁrms. The ﬁrms with high R&D expenditure prior to 2002 experienced a large increase in
the eﬀective tax credit rate between 2002 and 2003, while the eﬀective tax credit rate remained
roughly the same between 2002 and 2003 for ﬁrms without any R&D expenditure prior to 2002.
We exploit this variation in the changes in the eﬀective tax credit rate across ﬁrms to identify
1See also Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) and Ogawa (2007).
2the extent to which a tax credit aﬀects ﬁrms’ R&D expenditure.
Focusing on the details of the R&D tax policy changes in Japan, we use the cross-sectional
variation across ﬁrms in the changes in the eﬀective tax credit rate between 2002 and 2003 to
estimate the elasticity of R&D expenditure with respect to the eﬀective tax credit rate, and
we examine the empirical validity of the ﬁnancial constraint mechanism. Motivated by Hall
and Van Reenen (2000), Bloom, Griﬃth, and Van Reenen (2002), and Brown et al. (2009), we
consider a linear R&D investment model that includes terms representing possible interactions
between the eﬀective tax credit rate and the measure of ﬁnancial constraints. The model is
estimated by using ﬁrm-level panel data from the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure
and Activities with a proxy we construct for the eﬀective tax credit rate under the Japanese tax
credit system.
To understand how the 2003 tax credit reform aﬀects ﬁrms’ R&D investment, we develop a
simple two-period model of R&D investment and examine the optimal R&D investment policy.
First, even though the shift from the incremental to the total tax credit system increases credit
substantially, it does not necessarily aﬀect R&D investment. If the current R&D expenditure is
greater than the base level expenditure deﬁned in the incremental system, this R&D investment
remains unaﬀected because investment is determined by equating marginal beneﬁt and marginal
cost, and the tax credit reform does not change either in such a case. However, once we consider
the possibility of ﬁnancial constraint, the tax reform may have a large eﬀect on R&D investment.
When the ﬁnancial constraint is binding, preventing a ﬁrm from raising external funds for R&D,
an increase in the tax credit may increase the available internal funds in a one-to-one manner
and thus substantially increase R&D investment.
The baseline regression result suggests a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect of the change in the
eﬀective tax credit rate on corporate R&D investment. Estimating the ﬁrst-diﬀerence equation
of the linear R&D model between 2002 and 2003 by the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method
using the benchmark sample, we estimate the elasticities of the eﬀective tax credit rate on R&D
investment at 2.05% with a standard error of 0.60. When we estimate the R&D investment
equation with an interaction term between the eﬀective tax credit rate and the debt-to-asset
ratio as an additional regressor, the eﬀect of tax credit is signiﬁcantly larger for ﬁrms with
relatively large outstanding debts. Furthermore, splitting the benchmark sample into a sample
of small ﬁrms and a sample of large ﬁrms, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of the tax credit
on R&D investment for small ﬁrms with high debt-to-asset ratios, but we ﬁnd no evidence for a
positive eﬀect of the tax credit on large ﬁrms. This result is largely consistent with the ﬁnancial
constraint mechanism stated above if small ﬁrms are more likely to face ﬁnancial constraint
than are large ﬁrms. Using the baseline estimate, we ﬁnd that the aggregate value of R&D
expenditure would have been lower by 18.40% if the incremental tax credit system had been
implemented in 2003, suggesting a substantial impact of the Japanese tax credit reform on R&D
expenditure.
3To further examine the eﬀect of the tax credit on R&D investment, we estimate a linear R&D
investment model using diﬀerent samples and diﬀerent methods. First, to address a potential
sample selection issue, we estimate the R&D investment model together with a probit selection
equation using the Heckman two-step method. Second, to control for the endogeneity issue, we
estimate the ﬁrst-diﬀerence equation by the generalized method of moments (GMM). Third, we
use the panel data from 2000 to 2003. Finally, we examine the eﬀect of the tax credit on R&D
investment using an alternative measure of the eﬀective tax credit rate that takes into account
the cap on the tax credit and the possibility of a deferred tax credit. In some cases, the elasticities
of the eﬀective tax credit rate on R&D investment are estimated to be insigniﬁcant, providing
mixed evidence for the positive eﬀect of the tax credit on R&D investment. Conversely, across
diﬀerent methods, an interaction term between the eﬀective tax credit rate and the debt-to-asset
ratio is always estimated to be signiﬁcant for small ﬁrms, and thus, we ﬁnd robust evidence for
the importance of ﬁnancial constraints in determining the eﬀect of an R&D tax credit.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 explains the 2003 Japanese tax credit reform in detail. Section 4 explains our data
source and presents summary statistics. Section 5 develops a simple model of R&D expenditure
featuring the tax credit and examines how it aﬀects R&D investment. Section 6 explains our
empirical framework and reports the estimation results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The eﬀectiveness of the R&D tax credit has recently attracted considerable attention and been
studied extensively. The overall results suggest that the elasticity of R&D with respect to price
is approximately 1. In other words, 1 yen in tax credit for R&D stimulates approximately 1
yen of additional R&D. Hall and Van Reenen (2000) survey 10 U.S. studies and 10 international
studies of the econometric evidence on the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal incentives for R&D. From the
U.S. studies, Hall and Van Reenen (2000) conclude that “the tax price elasticity of total R&D
spending during the 1980s is on the order of unity, maybe higher.”
The results from more recent studies appear to support the conclusion by Hall and Van
Reenen (2000), at least qualitatively. Bloom, Griﬃth and Van Reenen (2002) examine the
impact of ﬁscal incentives on the level of R&D investment using a panel of data on tax changes
and R&D spending in nine OECD countries over a 19-year period (1979-1997). Bloom et al.
(2002) estimate the following dynamic speciﬁcation:
rit = λri,t−1 + βyit − γρit + fi + tt + uit,
where rit = log(industry-funded R&D), yit = log(output), ρit = log(user cost of R&D), fi is a
country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, and tt is a time dummy. Their estimate of λ is 0.868, and that of γ
4is −0.144, implying short-run and long-run elasticities of −0.144 and −1.088, respectively. This
estimate suggests that a 10% decrease in the cost of R&D stimulates a 1.44% increase in R&D
in the short-run, and approximately a 10.1% rise in R&D in the long run. A similar speciﬁcation
is used by Hall (1993) and other studies reported below.
Paﬀ (2005) estimates the tax price (user cost) elasticity of in-house (i.e., not contract) R&D
expenditure of biopharmaceutical and software ﬁrms in California by exploiting California’s
changes in R&D tax credit rates from 1994 to 1996 and from 1997 to 1999. The estimates by Paﬀ
(2005) are substantially higher than 1 and higher than 20 in some cases. Possible explanations
include ﬁrms’ greater sensitivity to state-level policy, industry factors, sample characteristics,
and measurement error.
Huang and Yang (2009) investigate the eﬀect of tax incentives on R&D activities in Taiwanese
manufacturing ﬁrms using a ﬁrm-speciﬁc panel dataset from 2001 to 2005. Propensity score
matching reveals that, on average, recipients of the R&D tax credit have a 93.53% higher R&D
expenditure and a 14.47% higher growth rate for R&D expenditure than do non-recipients with
similar characteristics. Huang and Yang (2009) estimate a panel ﬁxed eﬀect model by a GMM
and report that the estimated (short-run) elasticity of R&D with respect to the R&D tax credit
is 0.197 for all ﬁrms, 0.149 for high-tech ﬁrms, and 0.081 for non-high-tech ﬁrms.
Regarding the studies focused on the Japanese case, Koga (2003) examines the eﬀectiveness
of the R&D tax credit using data from 904 Japanese manufacturing ﬁrms over 10 years (1989
to 1998). Koga (2003) ﬁnds evidence that tax price elasticity is −0.68 when estimated from
all the ﬁrms and −1.03 when estimated from large ﬁrms, using the R&D data from Research
on R&D Activities in Private Firms (Minkan kigyou no kenkyuu katsudou ni kansuru chousa)
by the Science and Technology Agency supplemented by Nikkei Annual Corporation Reports
(Nikkei Shinbun Inc). Koga (2003) estimates the following dynamic speciﬁcation:
rit = βyi,t−1 − γρi,t−1 + fi + tt + uit,
where rit = log(corporate R&D investment), yit = log(sales) and log(user cost of R&D), fi is a
ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, and tt is a time dummy. The estimate of γ is −0.68 for all ﬁrms and
−1.03 for large ﬁrms. The coeﬃcient of lagged rit is reported to be insigniﬁcant.
Ohnishi and Nagata (2010) investigate the eﬀect of the 2003 R&D tax credit reform using a
dataset of 485 ﬁrms from the Report on the Survey of Research and Development (Kagaku gijutu
kenkyuu chousa) by the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and Communications. Using propensity
score matching, Ohnishi and Nagata (2010) compare the change in the R&D expenditures from
2002 to 2003 between those ﬁrms that use the new total (Sougaku gata) tax credit system and
those ﬁrms that do not use the new tax credit system. Firms that used the new Sougaku gata
tax credit system increased their R&D expenditure by 1.2%, whereas those that did not use the
new tax credit system decreased their R&D expenditure by 0.9%. Ohnishi and Nagata (2010)
5conclude that the increases in the R&D expenditures of these two groups of ﬁrms are essentially
the same. The dataset of Ohnishi and Nagata (2010) is peculiar. The ﬁrms are restricted
to the respondents of Kagaku Gijyutu Kenkyuu Chyosa, which may induce a sample-selection
bias. Furthermore, in their data set Ohnishi and Nagata (2010) observe little overall change
in the R&D expenditure between 2002 and 2003, whereas in our dataset the R&D expenditure
increases more than 5% between 2002 and 2003.
Motohashi (2010) combines ﬁrm-speciﬁc panel data over the period 1983 to 2005 from the
Report on the Survey of Research and Development (Kagaku gijutu kenkyu chousa) and from















+ β4taxit + β5taxi,t−1 + β6fi + β7tt,
where K is R&D capital stock constructed by the author, tax is the tax-adjusted cost of R&D,
f is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, and t is a time dummy. The estimated long-run eﬀect of the unit
R&D cost reduction (= β1 + β2) is approximately -0.5.
Cash ﬂow constraints have been documented to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrms’ R&D
activities. Because the tax system aﬀects the after-tax cash ﬂow, cash ﬂow is a potentially
important channel through which business tax policies aﬀect ﬁrms’ R&D activities. Ogawa
(2007) investigates the extent to which outstanding debt aﬀected ﬁrms’ R&D activities during
the 1990s using a panel data set of Japanese manufacturing ﬁrms in research-intensive industries.
Ogawa (2007) ﬁnds that the ratio of debt to total assets had a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on R&D
investment in the late 1990s but had an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on R&D investment in the late 1980s.
Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) examined the role of cash ﬂow and stock issues in
ﬁnancing R&D expenditure and found signiﬁcant eﬀects of cash ﬂow and external equity on
the R&D expenditure of young high-tech ﬁrms in the United States. Their result suggests that
young ﬁrms invest approximately 15% of additional equity funds in R&D.
63 R&D tax credit reform in 2003
This section describes the 2003 reform of the Japanese R&D tax credit system.2 We measure





where RDit denotes the R&D expenditure of ﬁrm i in period t and Xit denotes the amount of
tax credit3. The 2003 tax reform substantially changed the amount of tax credit (Xit) for which
each ﬁrm is eligible. Below, we explain how to compute Xit before and after the tax reform.
We ﬁrst explain the tax credit prior to 2002 (before the reform). Prior to 2002, the Japanese
R&D tax policy was characterized by the incremental tax credit system. We denote the average
of ﬁrm i’s three largest yearly R&D expenditures over the previous ﬁve years by RDit. Let Tit
denote the amount of the corporate tax that ﬁrm i owes in year t. Then, the R&D tax credit in




i2002 if 0.12Ti2002 ≥ X∗
i2002





i2002 = 0.15max{RDi2002 − RDi2002,0}I(RDi2002 > max{RDi2001,RDi2000})
and I(x > y) represents an indicator function. When RDi2002 ≤ RDi2002 or the R&D expen-
diture in 2002 is smaller than the last two years R&D expenditures, a ﬁrm receives no tax
credit; otherwise, the tax credit amount is roughly proportional to the diﬀerence between the
current R&D expenditure and the previous R&D expenditure (RDi2002 − RDi2002). Thus, un-
der the incremental tax credit system, an established R&D ﬁrm with a large R&D expenditure
receives little tax credit if the ﬁrm’s R&D expenditure is constant over the years, whereas a new
R&D ﬁrm with no past R&D experience may receive up to 15% of the total amount of R&D
expenditure as tax credit.
2We do not address the R&D tax credit for “special experimental research expenses,” including industry-
university cooperation R&D expenditures, because we cannot distinguish such expenses from other types of R&D
expenditures in our dataset. Also, we do not address “the R&D tax credit system for small or medium enterprises”
(Chusho kigyou gijutsu kiban kyouka zeisei in Japanese). Small or medium ﬁrms can choose between “the R&D
tax credit system for small or medium enterprises” and the tax credit system described in this section. The R&D
tax credit system for small or medium enterprises deﬁnes small or medium enterprises as (i) ﬁrms with capital
smaller than or equal to 100 million yen, (ii) ﬁrms without stockholder’s equity or contribution to capital, the
number of employees is less than 1000, and (iii) Agricultural cooperative and similar institutions.
3The Japanese R&D tax credit system deﬁnes R&D expenditure as the sum of own and outsourced research
and development expenses net of the amount received to conduct research projects that include subsidies from
the government and the amount received for commissioned R&D projects. This deﬁnition of R&D expenditure is
used to compute the tax credit in our data.
7In 2003, the Japanese government introduced the total tax credit system, in which a ﬁrm is
potentially eligible for a tax credit equal to 10 to 12% of the R&D expenditure, regardless of
previous R&D expenditures. Note that from 2003 to 2005, ﬁrms were able to choose between
the old incremental tax credit system and the new total tax credit system. The R&D tax credit
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i2003 = κ(RDi2003/Y i2003)RDi2003 with κ(x) = (0.2x + 0.1)I(x < 0.1) + 0.12I(x ≥ 0.1),
and Y it =
∑3
s=0 Yit−s/4.
We compute the eﬀective tax credit rate using data from the Basic Survey of Japanese
Business Structure and Activities, following the formulas described above.4. Table 1 reports the
mean and the standard deviation of the changes in our measure of the eﬀective tax credit rate,
∆τit = τit − τit−1, across ﬁrms for each year from 2000 to 2005. Looking at the years 2002 and
2003, we notice that the average eﬀective tax credit rate increased by 9.27% between 2002 and
2003, indicating the substantial impact of the 2003 tax credit reform on the average eﬀective
tax credit rate.5 In contrast, the average change in the eﬀective tax credit rate is close to zero
for years other than 2002 and 2003.
Figures 1 and 2 plot a relationship between the log of R&D expenditure and the eﬀective
tax credit rate across ﬁrms in 2002 and 2003, respectively, while Figure 3 plots a change in the
log of R&D expenditure against the change in the eﬀective tax credit rate between 2002 and
2003. As shown in Figure 1, a large number of ﬁrms have a zero tax credit rate but a positive
R&D expenditure in 2002. These R&D ﬁrms are not eligible for a tax credit in 2002 because
their R&D levels in 2002 are not as high as the previous R&D levels, but they become eligible
for the tax credit in 2003. As shown in Figure 2, all R&D ﬁrms are eligible for at least 10%
of the eﬀective tax rate in 2003. Thus, the changes in the eﬀective tax rates across diﬀerent
ﬁrms between 2002 and 2003 exhibit a large variation. In Figure 3, a group of ﬁrms have ∆τ2003
values between 0.10 and 0.15; many of these ﬁrms were not eligible for any tax credit in 2002.6
On average, ﬁrms without any tax credit in 2002 experience a 10.5% increase in the eﬀective
tax credit rate, while ﬁrms with positive tax credit in 2002 experience a 6.0% increase.
Because the tax credit crucially depended on previous R&D expenditures in the incremen-
tal tax system, the introduction of the total tax credit system in 2003 induced heterogeneous
4For details on how to compute the eﬀective tax credit rate for our data, see Appendix A.2
5Using data from the Corporation Sample Survey conducted by the National Tax Agency, Ohnishi and Nagata
(2010) report that the amount of aggregate tax credit after the 2003 tax credit reform is 6 to 11 times as large as
that before the reform.
6The maximum value of ∆2003 is 0.15, because for 2003, we compute the tax credit as the maximum value
between the tax credit under the incremental system and the tax credit under the total system, taking into
account that ﬁrms could choose between the two systems.
8changes in the eﬀective tax credit rate across ﬁrms. Those ﬁrms that conducted large R&D
investment before 2002 gained a large beneﬁt from the 2003 tax reform, while those who did
not conduct R&D investment before 2002 gained little. As Table 2 reports, comparing across
diﬀerent quartiles of the previous R&D expenditure RDi2002, we ﬁnd that the higher the R&D
expenditure was before 2002, the larger the increase in the eﬀective tax credit rate between 2002
and 2003. This cross-sectional variation in the changes in the eﬀective tax credit rate before
and after the tax reform enables us to identify the eﬀect of the tax credit on R&D expenditure.
Table 3 shows the average eﬀective tax credit rate across four groups of ﬁrms with positive
R&D expenditures in 2002, classiﬁed according to their R&D experiences over the previous
ﬁve years: (1) no past experience in R&D, (2) one year of R&D experience, (3) two years of
R&D experience, and (4) more than three years of R&D experience. The average eﬀective
tax credit rate decreases with the years of R&D experience from 0.15 to 0.01. To explain,
consider an example ﬁrm that began its R&D activity in 2000. Because this ﬁrm’s previous
R&D expenditure before 2000 is equal to zero, this ﬁrm is eligible for a tax credit of 15% of its
2000 R&D expenditure as long as that expenditure is below the corporate tax owed by the ﬁrm.
In 2001, this ﬁrm faces an eﬀective tax credit rate lower than 15% because now the previous
R&D expenditure is no longer zero. Thus, under the incremental tax system, the eﬀective tax
credit rate tends to decrease over time for the ﬁrst three years of R&D activity.
4 Data
4.1 Data Source
We use data from the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities (BSJ, here-
after) conducted by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). This survey covers
all Japanese ﬁrms with 50 or more employees, whose paid-up capital or investment fund is over
30 million yen and whose operations are classiﬁed as mining, manufacturing, or wholesale and
retail trade, and eating and drinking establishments. The survey collects basic corporate ﬁnance
data and detailed data on various business activities, such as exports/imports and R&D activi-
ties. This survey began in 1991 and has been conducted annually since 1994. All ﬁrms with the
characteristics stated above receive a survey questionnaire and report data for the last or most
recent accounting year. Response rates have been high, and thus, the size of the cross-section
sample has been large, comprising 25,000 to 30,000 ﬁrms each year.7
4.2 Sample Selection and Summary Statistics
We focus our attention on manufacturing ﬁrms. Furthermore, we select our sample as described
in Table 4. Fist, to focus on large ﬁrms, we exclude observations of ﬁrms with asset values
7For example, the response rate for the 2010 survey was 83.8%.
9smaller than or equal to 100 million yen. Because small or medium ﬁrms can choose between
the R&D tax credit system for small or medium enterprises and that for all ﬁrms, including
small or medium ﬁrms in the sample substantially complicates our analysis. In our sample for
2000 to 2005, the fraction of the aggregate R&D investment explained by these small/medium
ﬁrms is small, only 1.2% for the manufacturing industry.
Second, we only consider ﬁrms whose accounting year closes in March. The new total tax
credit system became available for the accounting year that began after January 2003. Because
the BSJ survey was conducted in June until 2007, in the 2004 BSJ survey any ﬁrm whose
accounting year closes before June would report the data for the 2003 accounting year, and
thus, the new total tax credit system would apply to the accounting year of the 2004 survey.
In contrast, any ﬁrm whose accounting year closes after June would report the data for the
2002 accounting year so that the old incremental tax credit system still applied. By tracking
which accounting years close in March, we keep the former groups of the ﬁrms in the sample; a
majority of Japanese ﬁrms close their accounting years in March.
Third, because the tax credit under the incremental system crucially depends on ﬁrms’ R&D
expenditure over the previous 5 years, we reject observations for which prior R&D expenditures
are missing. Speciﬁcally, given that the incremental tax credit system sets the base level to
the average R&D expenditure over the selected three of the ﬁve previous years, we exclude
observations with more than two years of missing R&D expenditures from the previous ﬁve
years.
Tables 1- 3 are constructed from the sample that is obtained by applying these three criteria.
Table 5 reports summary statistics for this sample from 2001 to 2004. Each entry except for
the last row refers to the average of the corresponding variable in the benchmark sample. The
last row reports the number of observations. Rows designated as ‘R&D Exp./Y’ and ‘R&D
Exp./N’ report the averages of the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales and that to the number of
employees, respectively. For those rows, the sample is restricted to the observations with strictly
positive R&D expenditures. ‘Asset’ refers to the sum of liquid and ﬁxed assets. ‘Debt’ refers
to the sum of liquid and ﬁxed debts. ‘Positive R&D’ refers to the fraction of observations with
strictly positive R&D expenditures.
For the basic regression analysis using the sample observations from 2002 and 2003, we
further exclude the observations for which R&D expenditures are missing or zero as well as the
observations for which some variables that are necessary to compute the eﬀective tax credit
rate are missing. When we estimate the regression equation with the debt-to-asset ratio as an
additional regressor, we use a sample that excludes the observations for which the debt-to-asset
ratio is missing in either 2002 or 2003.
105 An R&D Investment Model
To understand how a tax credit aﬀects R&D expenditure, this section examines a simple two-
period model of R&D expenditure with ﬁnancial constraint. We denote the ﬁrst period by t and
the second period by t + 1. Let πt = π(Kt,zt) be the proﬁt function, where Kt represents the
stock of R&D capital and zt represents productivity that follows a ﬁrst-order Markov process
with transition distribution function F(zt+1|zt). Given zt, the support of F(·|zt) is given by
[z(zt), ¯ z(zt)], where z(zt) is increasing in zt. The law of motion for R&D capital stock is given
by Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It, where It is the R&D expenditure and δ is the depreciation rate.





2(It/Kt)2Kt captures the diﬃculty of adjusting the amount of R&D capital.
Because a large portion of R&D spending is the wages and salaries of highly educated scientists
and engineers (see Lach and Schankerman (1989)), the coeﬃcient γ partially reﬂects the degree
of diﬃculty to hire and ﬁre these knowledge workers in a short period of time.
We consider the following simpliﬁed tax credit systems for periods before 2002 and after
2003:
φt = φt(It,It−1) =
{
max{0.15(It − It−1),0} if t ≤ 2002
max{0.15It,0} if t ≥ 2003,
where φt(It,It−1) denotes the amount of tax credit for R&D expenditure. The total tax credit
system after 2003 provides a larger amount of tax credit than the incremental tax credit system
before 2002, especially for the ﬁrms with large amounts of previous R&D expenditure.
5.1 An R&D investment model without ﬁnancial friction
We ﬁrst analyze a ﬁrm’s R&D investment decision without ﬁnancial constraint by considering







where p < 1 − δ is the resale value of R&D capital and ξ is a tax rate on proﬁt.
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where MR(It) is the marginal revenue of R&D investment and MC∗ and MC∗∗ represent the
marginal costs of R&D investment when
∂φt(It,It 1)
∂It is equal to 0.15 and 0, respectively. Let I∗
and I∗∗ be the optimal amount of R&D expenditure when the marginal costs are given by MC∗
11and MC∗∗, respectively, so that MR(I∗) = MC∗(I∗) and MR(I∗∗) = MC∗∗(I∗).
Under the total tax credit system after 2003, the marginal cost function is given by MC(It) =
MC∗(It), and the optimal amount of R&D expenditure is given by It = I∗. Conversely, under
the incremental tax credit system before 2002,
∂φt(It,It 1)
∂It is a discontinuous function of It at
It = It−1. As a result, the marginal cost function under the incremental tax credit system is
also discontinuous and given by
MC(It) =
{
MC∗(It) if It > It−1,
MC∗∗(It) if It ≤ It−1.
Figures 4 to 6 illustrate how the amount of R&D expenditure is determined under the incre-
mental tax credit system. In Figure 4, when the previous R&D expenditure is low enough that
It−1 < I∗∗, a ﬁrm beneﬁts from the tax credit by choosing the current year’s R&D expenditure
to be greater than the past year’s R&D expenditure, where the optimal R&D expenditure is
determined by MR(It) = MC∗(It). In contrast, in Figure 5, the past R&D expenditure is
high enough that a ﬁrm’s optimal choice of R&D expenditure is lower than the previous R&D
expenditure; in this case, a ﬁrm receives no tax credit. Figure 6 illustrates the intermediate case
I∗∗ ≤ It−1 < I∗, in which a ﬁrm chooses It = I∗ only if it yields a proﬁt higher than the proﬁt
from choosing It = I∗∗. Thus, the optimal R&D expenditure under the incremental tax credit
system is given by
It =
{
I∗ if It−1 < I∗∗ or if I∗∗ ≤ It−1 < I∗ and Π(I∗,Kt,It−1,zt) > Π(I∗∗,Kt,It−1,zt),
I∗∗ if It−1 ≥ I∗ or if I∗∗ ≤ It−1 < I∗ and Π(I∗,Kt,It−1,zt) ≤ Π(I∗∗,Kt,It−1,zt).
The eﬀect of tax reform may depend on the previous year’s R&D expenditure. Consider
a ﬁrm whose previous year’s R&D expenditure is suﬃciently lower than the current year’s
“optimal” R&D expenditure. In this case,
∂φt(It,It 1)
∂It = 0.15 for both tax regimes, and the
ﬁrm would choose the identical R&D expenditure across two diﬀerent tax policies under the
optimality condition 0.85 + γ(It/Kt) =
1−ξ
1+rE[πK(Kt+1,zt+1) + p|zt]. Thus, for such ﬁrms, the
change from the incremental to the total tax credit system does not aﬀect the decision rule for
R&D expenditure.8
In contrast, for a ﬁrm whose previous year’s R&D expenditure is suﬃciently higher than the
current year’s optimal R&D expenditure, the tax credit reform in 2003 may positively aﬀect the
R&D expenditure. When a ﬁrm invests less in R&D than in the previous year (i.e., It < It−1),
that ﬁrm is not eligible for any tax credit under the incremental tax credit system but eligible
for a tax credit of 15% under the total tax credit system. Consequently, the change from
the incremental to the total tax credit system will decrease the ﬁrm’s marginal cost of R&D
8This result follows because the optimal investment level is determined by equating the marginal return to the
marginal cost of R&D investment, and the tax credit reform aﬀects neither the marginal cost nor the marginal
return as long as the current year’s investment is larger than the previous year’s.
12investment by 15% and, as a result, its R&D expenditure will increase.
The model implies that the eﬀect of tax credit reforms on R&D expenditure would be
heterogeneous across ﬁrms and that this eﬀect depends on the pre-2002 R&D expenditures. The
ﬁrms with a large amount of R&D expenditure from 1997 to 2001 may experience a substantial
change in the eﬀective tax credit rate in 2003. In contrast, the eﬀective tax credit rate does
not change before and after the 2003 tax reform (given at 15%) for the ﬁrms without any R&D
investment from 1997 to 2001. We exploit this variation in the eﬀective tax credit rate across
ﬁrms in our empirical analysis.
5.2 An R&D investment model with ﬁnancial constraint
Because the 2003 tax reform may have a substantial impact on the after-tax cash ﬂow, the
change from the incremental to the total tax credit system may have had an impact on R&D
expenditure by relaxing ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial constraints. To address this issue, we extend a two
period investment model by incorporating ﬁnancial constraint.
Consider a ﬁrm with state (bt,Kt,zt,It−1) in the ﬁrst period, where bt represents the out-
standing short-term debt at the beginning of period t. Here, bt refers to the amount that the
ﬁrm is supposed to repay in period t. The real interest rate is denoted by r. In the second
period t + 1, this ﬁrm is forced to sell itself after obtaining the proﬁt.
The dividend in the ﬁrst period is given by dt(Kt,It,It−1,zt,bt,bt+1), where
dt = (1 − ξ)π(Kt,zt) − ψ(It,Kt) + φt(It,It−1) − bt + bt+1/(1 + r). (4)
We assume that the ﬁrm faces ﬁnancial constraint such that the maximum amount of bond it can
issue is limited by the amount it can repay without any possibility of default. This restriction
requires that the maximum amount of borrowing be less than the worst possible proﬁt plus the
resale value of ﬁrm in the second period:
bt+1 ≤ (1 − ξ)π(Kt+1,z(zt)) + pKt+1.
Furthermore, we assume that a ﬁrm cannot raise funds by issuing equity: dt ≥ 0.9 Then, the






E[(1 − ξ)π(Kt+1,zt+1) + pKt+1|zt] (5)
s.t. bt+1 ≤ (1 − ξ)π(Kt+1,z(zt)) + pKt+1,
d(Kt,It,It−1,zt,bt,bt+1) ≥ 0.
9A similar argument applies when we alternatively assume that there is a convex adjustment cost of issuing
equity.
13In the presence of such ﬁnancial constraint, the 2003 tax credit reform may positively aﬀect
the R&D investment by relaxing the ﬁnancial constraint. This eﬀect can be seen from the budget
constraint in the ﬁrm’s R&D investment problem (5). The eﬀect of tax reform is represented by
the change in the tax credit function φt(It,It−1). For any ﬁrm that conducted R&D investment
during the previous year (i.e., It−1 > 0), the tax credit φt(It,It−1) would be higher after the tax
reform than before. As a result, the tax reform increases the R&D investment by increasing the
internal funds for R&D investment. The larger the amount of R&D investment before the tax
reform is, the larger the eﬀect of tax reform on the current year’s investment.
The essence of this argument can be understood by considering the extreme case of π(Kt+1,z(zt)) =
0 and p = 0. The assumption that π(Kt+1,z(zt)) = 0 implies that a ﬁrm might earn zero proﬁt
with some positive probability, and p = 0 implies that the resale value of R&D capital is zero. In
this case, the ﬁnancial constraint is given by bt+1 ≤ 0 so that borrowing is impossible. Because
equity ﬁnancing is also assumed to be restricted, the maximum amount of R&D expenditure
a ﬁrm can possibly ﬁnance is limited by the internal cash ﬂow. Speciﬁcally, the constraint
d(Kt,It,It−1,zt,bt,bt+1) ≥ 0 implies that
It ≤ ¯ I(zt,Kt,It−1,bt),
where ¯ I(zt,Kt,It−1,bt) is deﬁned by (1−ξ)π(Kt,zt)−ψ(¯ I(zt,Kt,It−1,bt),Kt)+φt(¯ I(zt,Kt,It−1,bt),It−1)−
bt = 0. When the optimal R&D expenditure under no ﬁnancial constraint discussed in the pre-
vious section is higher than ¯ I(zt,Kt,It−1,bt), the ﬁnancial constraint is binding, and the R&D
expenditure under ﬁnancial constraint is ¯ I(zt,Kt,It−1,bt). Because ¯ I(zt,Kt,It−1,bt) is decreas-
ing in the amount of debt bt and the previous R&D expenditure It−1, the R&D expenditure It
is decreasing in bt and It−1 when the constraint is binding.
The 2003 tax credit reform increases the internal cash ﬂow by 0.15It−1, and the reform may
thus increase the R&D expenditure of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms by as much as 0.15It−1.
The model implies that the larger the amount of debt bt, the more likely the ﬁrm is to be
ﬁnancially constrained. Therefore, we expect that the eﬀect of the tax credit reform in 2003
through a change in the eﬀective tax credit rate would be increasing in the amount of debt bt.
This implication is tested in our empirical analysis by including the interaction term between
the debt-to-asset ratio and the eﬀective tax credit rate in our speciﬁcations.
6 Empirical Analysis
To examine the tax credit eﬀect on R&D investment, we estimate linear investment models using
the BSJ data. Our baseline model follows that of Bloom, Griﬃth, and Van Reenen (2002) and
is given by
lnRDit = βτit + γ lnYit + ηt + µi + ϵit, (6)
14where RDit is ﬁrm i’s R&D expenditure in year t, τit is the eﬀective rate of the R&D tax credit
for ﬁrm i’s R&D expenditure in year t, and Yit is the sales of ﬁrm i in year t. The term ηt captures
an aggregate time eﬀect, µi is a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect, and ϵit is an idiosyncratic unobservable shock
that aﬀects ﬁrm i’s decision concerning R&D expenditure in year t.
Our measure of R&D expenditure is the sum of own and outsourced research and development
expenses. Following the tax credit formulas described in Section 3, we construct a measure for
the eﬀective tax credit rate, τit, deﬁned by (1) using the BSJ data on R&D expenditure and
sales. As explained in Appendix A.2, there are two omissions due to a lack of information in
the BSJ data. First, for the benchmark analysis, we do not take into account that the credit is
capped by a certain fraction (12 to 20%) of the corporate tax.10 Second, we do not distinguish
special experimental research expenses from other types of R&D expenditure.
To control for endogeneity due to the ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects µi, we take the ﬁrst diﬀerence of
(6) to obtain
∆lnRDit = β∆τit + γ∆lnYit + ∆ηt + ∆ϵit. (7)
This expression is our basic econometric speciﬁcation.
As we discussed in the previous section, the shift from the incremental to the total tax credit
system in 2003 may increase R&D investment for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms with insuﬃcient
internal funds. To examine whether the ﬁnancial constraint aﬀects R&D investment, we incor-
porate into the above model a debt-to-asset ratio that partially accounts for the cross-sectional
variation in ﬁrms’ internal funds. Speciﬁcally, we include the level of a debt-to-asset ratio and
its interaction with the eﬀective tax credit rate in equation (6) as






+ ηt + µi + ϵit. (8)
where bit and Kit represent ﬁrm i’s outstanding debt and ﬁxed assets in the beginning of year t,
respectively. We use the sum of the liquid and ﬁxed debts for bit, and we use the stock of ﬁxed
asset constructed by the perpetual inventory method for Kit, as explained in Appendix A.3-A.4.
We estimate the ﬁrst-diﬀerence version of (8):











+ ∆ηt + ∆ϵit. (9)
The positive value of θ implies that the eﬀect of the 2003 tax credit reform is especially large for
the ﬁrms with high debt-to-asset ratios. To the extent that a higher debt-to-asset ratio leads to
a tighter ﬁnancial constraint, the positive value of θ provides evidence that the 2003 tax credit
reform promotes the R&D expenditure of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms.
We ﬁrst estimate the ﬁrst-diﬀerence equations (7) and (9), respectively, by the OLS using the
10A deferred tax credit was introduced in 2003 so that, even when the credit cap was binding in 2003, ﬁrms
were able to reclaim the remaining amount above the credit cap in the following year.
15benchmark sample with strictly positive values of R&D expenditure in 2002 and 2003. The result
is reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. In column (1), the estimated elasticity of R&D
expenditure with respect to the eﬀective tax credit rate is 2.05% with a standard error of 0.60.
Estimating the ﬁrst-diﬀerence equation with the debt-to-asset ratio (9), we obtain a signiﬁcantly
positive estimate of the coeﬃcient of ∆τit (2.02, in column (2)), while the estimated coeﬃcient
of ∆(bit/Kit) is insigniﬁcantly negative. Conversely, the estimated coeﬃcient of the interaction
term ∆(τitbit/Kit) is signiﬁcantly positive, indicating that the positive eﬀect of the 2003 tax
credit reform on R&D expenditure is especially large for ﬁrms with high debt-to-asset ratios
that may have diﬃculty obtaining additional external ﬁnancing for their R&D expenditures. As
reported in Table 7, the tax credit elasticities depend on the value of the debt-to-asset ratio, and
they are estimated to be 2.06, 2.10, and 2.31 at the 5th percentile, median, and 95th percentile
of the debt-to-asset ratio, respectively.
How large was the eﬀect of the change from the incremental to the total tax credit system
on R&D expenditure in 2003? Based on the estimate in column (2) of Table 6, we compute the
counterfactual value of aggregate R&D expenditure in 2003 if the incremental tax credit system
were to have been implemented in 2003. The results are reported in Table 8.11 The “Aggregate”
row indicates that had the total tax credit system not been introduced in 2003, the aggregate
value of R&D expenditure would have been lower by 18.40 percent. Conversely, the “Average,”
“Average (bit/Kit ≤ p10),” and “Average (bit/Kit ≥ p90)” rows report that, had the incremental
tax credit system been implemented in 2003, the average value of R&D expenditure would have
been lower by 18.06 percent, 17.91 percent, and 19.33% for the sample used in column (2) of
Table 6, for the subsample with a debt-to-asset ratio smaller than its 10th percentile value, and
for the subsample with a debt-to-asset ratio greater than its 90th percentile, respectively. These
decreases indicate that the introduction of the total tax credit system had a larger impact on
ﬁrms with high debt-to-asset ratios than ﬁrms with low debt-to-asset ratios.
Columns (3) to (6) of Table 6 compare the eﬀects of the eﬀective tax credit rate on R&D
expenditure for small and large ﬁrms. When small ﬁrms are more likely than large ﬁrms to face
ﬁnancial constraint for their R&D expenditures, the eﬀect of the tax credit is expected to be
larger for small ﬁrms than for large ﬁrms. To address this diﬀerence, we split the benchmark
11To obtain the estimates reported in Table 8, we ﬁrst compute the counterfactual value of the eﬀective tax
credit rate in 2003 for each ﬁrm using the formula for the incremental tax credit system as described in Appendix
A.2. Then, with this counterfactual value of the eﬀective tax credit rate, we compute the counterfactual value of
ﬁrms’ R&D expenditure in 2003 predicted by the estimate in column (2) of Table 6 when the incremental tax credit
system had been implemented. Finally, this counterfactual value of ﬁrms’ R&D expenditure in 2003 under the
incremental tax credit system is compared with the value of the ﬁrms’ R&D expenditure under the total tax credit
system in 2003 predicted by the estimate in column (2) of Table 6. The “Aggregate” row reports a percentage
diﬀerence in the sum of the predicted R&D expenditure under the total tax credit system and the sum of the
predicted R&D expenditure under the incremental tax credit system across all ﬁrms in 2003. The “Average,”
“Average (bit=Kit  p10),” and “Average (bit=Kit  p90)” rows report the average percentage diﬀerence between
the predicted R&D expenditure under the total tax credit system and those under the incremental tax credit
system for the sample used in column (2) of Table 6, that for the subsample with bit=Kit smaller than its 10th
percentile value, and that for the subsample with bit=Kit greater than its 90th percentile, respectively.
16sample at the median value of the ﬁxed asset in 2003 and estimate equations (7) and (9) sepa-
rately for each sample. Columns (3) and (4) report the results for small ﬁrms, and columns (5)
and (6) report the results for large ﬁrms. The coeﬃcients of ∆τit are signiﬁcantly positive at
2.92 and 2.81 in columns (3) and (4), but they are insigniﬁcantly positive in columns (5) and (6).
Furthermore, the estimated coeﬃcient of ∆(τitbit/Kit) is signiﬁcant with the expected sign in
column (4), but it is not signiﬁcant in column (6). Thus, we ﬁnd evidence for the positive eﬀect
of the 2003 tax credit reform on R&D expenditure among small ﬁrms with high debt-to-asset
ratios but no evidence for the eﬀect of the tax credit among large ﬁrms.
The result reported in Table 6 is based on the observations with strictly positive values of
R&D expenditure in 2002 and 2003. We restrict the data in such a way because the dependent
variable is the logarithm of R&D expenditure and so cannot assume zero R&D expenditure
values. The omission of observations with zero R&D expenditure may lead to sample selection




iψ + vi ≤ 0,
1 if Z′
iψ + vi > 0,
(10)
where si is a selection indicator equal to 1 if RDit > 0 for both t = 2002 and t = 2003 and
equal to 0 otherwise. Following Heckman (1979), we ﬁrst estimate a probit equation (10) to
obtain an estimate of ψ, denoted by ˆ ψ, and compute ˆ λi ≡ λ(Z′
i ˆ ψ) = E[vi|Zi,vi > −Z′
i ˆ ψ],
where λ(·) is the inverse Mill’s ratio; in the second step, we estimate the parameters in (7)
and (9) by the OLS with ˆ λi as an additional regressor. The presence of selection bias can
be tested by examining whether the coeﬃcient of ˆ λi is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. We
choose Zi = (1,lnYi2002,lnYi2003,I(RDi2000 > 0),I(RDi2001 > 0))′ to estimate (7) and Zi =
(1,lnYi2002,lnYi2003,bi2002/Ki2002,bi2003/Ki2003,I(RDi2000 > 0),I(RDi2001 > 0))′ to estimate
(9). Appendix Appendix B discusses in detail the motivation for our choice of Zi and the
required assumption for consistency under endogenous sample selection.
Table 9 reports the results of estimating equations (7) and (9) with the probit selection equa-
tion (10) using Heckman’s two step method.12 For the benchmark sample and for the sample of
large ﬁrms, the coeﬃcient of ˆ λi is signiﬁcantly positive, providing evidence for sample selection.
Comparing the estimates in Table 9 with those in Table 6, we notice that the estimated eﬀect
of the eﬀective tax credit rate on R&D expenditure becomes larger after controlling for selec-
tion, while the estimated coeﬃcients of ∆(bit/Kit) and ∆(τitbit/Kit) remain roughly the same
before and after controlling for selection. The estimated coeﬃcient of ∆(bit/Kit) is signiﬁcantly
negative, and thus, an increase in the debt-to-asset ratio is positively correlated with a decline
in R&D expenditure between 2002 and 2003; one possible reason for this correlation is that a
12To save space, we do not report the estimates of the probit selection equation, but they are summarized as
follows: across diﬀerent samples and diﬀerent speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients of I(RDi2000 > 0) and I(RDi2001 > 0)
are signiﬁcantly positive, while the coeﬃcients of other variables are insigniﬁcant.
17ﬁrm with a higher debt-to-asset ratio faces a tighter ﬁnancial constraint for R&D investment.
Furthermore, in columns (5) and (6) of Table 9, the estimated coeﬃcient of ∆τit is now signiﬁ-
cantly positive, suggesting a positive eﬀect of the tax credit on R&D expenditure for large ﬁrms.
Conversely, the estimated coeﬃcient of ∆(τitbit/Kit) remains insigniﬁcant in column (6), and
we continue to ﬁnd no evidence for the importance of ﬁnancial constraint among large ﬁrms.13
The validity of OLS regression analysis based on the ﬁrst-diﬀerence speciﬁcations (7) and
(9) depends on the assumption that the tax credit change, ∆τit, is uncorrelated with the change
in the unobserved determinants of R&D expenditure, ∆ϵit. As shown in Figure 2, the eﬀective
tax credit rate τit is positively correlated with the R&D expenditure in 2003, suggesting that
the eﬀective tax credit rate, τit, and unobserved determinants of R&D expenditure, µi + ϵit in
equations (6) and (8), may be positively correlated. While taking the ﬁrst diﬀerence between
2002 and 2003 eliminates the endogeneity due to a positive correlation between τit and the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc eﬀect µi, a contemporary positive correlation between τit and the idiosyncratic factor ϵit
may cause a positive correlation between ∆τit and ∆ϵit and may lead to the endogeneity bias.
To address this endogeneity issue, we estimate the ﬁrst-diﬀerence equations (7) and (9) by the
two-step GMM. We use the two- and three-year lagged values of the eﬀective tax credit rate, τit−2
and τit−3, and the two-year lagged value of the ratio of the “past average R&D expenditure” to
capital stock, RDit−2/Kit−2, as instruments for ∆τit to estimate the equation (7), where RDit
is deﬁned in Section 3. Furthermore, we use τit−2, τit−3, RDit−2/Kit−2, τit−2(bit−2/Kit−2),
and (RDit−2/Kit−2)(bit−2/Kit−2) as instruments for ∆τit and ∆(τit(bit/Kit)) to estimate the
equation (9). Our choice of instruments is motivated by their ability to predict the value of
τit−1 while we will examine the validity of moment conditions by an over-identifying restriction
test.14
The result of the GMM estimation is reported in Table 10. The p-value of Hansen’s J
test provides evidence for the validity of the moment conditions across diﬀerent speciﬁcations
using diﬀerent samples. While the estimated coeﬃcient of ∆τit is not signiﬁcant, the estimated
coeﬃcient of ∆(τit(bit/Kit)) is signiﬁcant and positive in columns (2) and (4), providing evidence
for the importance of ﬁnancial constraint as a determinant of the eﬀect of the tax credit on R&D
expenditure among small ﬁrms. As reported in columns (5) and (6), neither the coeﬃcient of
∆τit nor that of ∆(τit(bit/Kit)) is signiﬁcant for large ﬁrms.15
13As a robustness check, to minimize the functional form assumption on the probit selec-
tion equation, we also estimated (7) and (9) with the probit selection equation (10) using
the quadratic and interaction terms of (lnYi2002;lnYi2003;I(RDi2000 > 0);I(RDi2001 > 0)) and
(lnYi2002;lnYi2003;bi2002=Ki2002;bi2003=Ki2003;I(RDi2000 > 0);I(RDi2001 > 0)), respectively, as additional ele-
ments for Zi, and we found that the estimates were similar to those reported in Table 9.
14When we regress it 2, it 3, and RDit 2=Kit 2 on ∆it in the benchmark sample, it 2, it 3, and
RDit 2=Kit 2 are signiﬁcantly negative (with the F-test statistic for the joint signiﬁcance equal to 32.71), im-
plying a p-value less than 0.001. Similarly, regressing it 2(bit 2=Kit 2) and (RDit 2=Kit 2)(bit 2=Kit 2) on
∆(it(bit=Kit), the F-test statistic is determined to be 40.85, indicating their joint signiﬁcance.
15When we estimate (7) and (9) with ˆ i as an additional regressor by the GMM to correct for sample selection
[not reported here], we obtain estimates similar to those reported in Table 10 except that the point estimates for
18While we have so far focused on the change in the eﬀective tax credit rate between 2002 and
2003, it is also possible to analyze the eﬀect of the tax credit on R&D expenditure using the
observations prior to 2002 under the incremental tax system. As reported in the upper panel of
Table 1, there exists a substantial variation in the eﬀective tax credit rate across ﬁrms prior to
2002, and we may use this cross-sectional variation to empirically analyze the eﬀect of the tax
credit on R&D expenditure.
Table 11 reports the result of the GMM estimation using the panel observations from 2000 to
2003; the set of instruments used is the same as the one we used in Table 10. While the test for
over-identifying restrictions is rejected at a 10% signiﬁcance level in column (1), it is not rejected
at a 10% signiﬁcance level in column (2), providing some evidence for the validity of moment
conditions based on the speciﬁcation (9). The estimated coeﬃcient of ∆τit is signiﬁcant at 3.36
and 2.63 in columns (1) and (2), respectively, while the estimated coeﬃcient of ∆(τit(bit/Kit))
is signiﬁcant and positive at 0.23 in column (2). For the sample of small ﬁrms, the coeﬃcient
of ∆τit is insigniﬁcantly positive in columns (3) and (4), but the coeﬃcient of ∆(τit(bit/Kit))
is signiﬁcantly positive at 0.22. For the sample of large ﬁrms, the coeﬃcients of ∆τit and
∆(τit(bit/Kit)) are not signiﬁcant. Overall, these results indicate that the tax credit promotes
R&D investment for small, ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, but not for large ﬁrms.
In the benchmark sample for Tables 6-11, we use the tax credit variable τit, which does
not take into account that the tax credit is capped by a certain fraction of the corporate tax.
Using a tax credit variable that ignores such a cap could lead to bias in our estimates. To
partially address this issue, we use a diﬀerence between ordinary and net proﬁts as a proxy for
the amount of corporate tax and construct the eﬀective tax credit rate under the cap. We also
consider the deferred tax credit in 2003, as explained in Appendix A.2. Note, however, that this
alternative measure of corporate tax is likely to contain substantial measurement errors because,
for example, it contains accounting depreciation and gains and losses from sales/revaluation of
liquid and ﬁxed assets in addition to corporate tax paid.
Tables 12, 13, 14, and 15 report the results corresponding to Tables 6, 9, 10, and 11, respec-
tively, using this alternative measure of tax credit that takes into account the credit cap and the
deferred tax credit. Comparing Tables 12, 13, 14, and 15 with Tables 6, 9, 10, and 11, we notice
that the coeﬃcient of ∆τit tends to be estimated using this alternative measure of tax credit
at values smaller, and often insigniﬁcantly so, than those estimated using the original measure
of tax credit. This lack of signiﬁcance for the coeﬃcient of ∆τit might reﬂect the measurement
errors in the alternative measure of tax credit. Nonetheless, an interaction term between the
eﬀective tax credit rate and the debt-to-asset ratio is signiﬁcantly positive for small ﬁrms across
diﬀerent methods in Tables 12-15, providing further evidence for the role of ﬁnancial constraint
in determining the eﬀect of the tax credit on R&D expenditure.
the coeﬃcient of ∆it tend to be slightly larger.
197 Conclusion
This paper investigates the eﬀect of the Japanese tax credit policy change in 2003 on ﬁrms’
R&D investment by using the panel data of Japanese manufacturing ﬁrms. By regressing a
change in the eﬀective tax credit rate on a change in the log of R&D expenditure between 2002
and 2003 in the benchmark sample, we ﬁnd that an increase in the tax credit has a signiﬁcantly
positive eﬀect on R&D expenditure and that this positive eﬀect is especially large for small
ﬁrms with high debt-to-asset ratios. When we use diﬀerent methods and diﬀerent samples, we
ﬁnd mixed evidence for the positive eﬀect of the tax credit on R&D expenditure; however, the
overall results suggest that the impact of the tax credit on R&D expenditure is larger for small
ﬁrms with ﬁnancial constraint than for large ﬁrms without ﬁnancial constraint.
The results of this paper must be interpreted with caution. First, owing to the lack of data,
our measure of the eﬀective tax credit rate is far from perfect. Second, we use the debt-to-asset
ratio to capture the extent to which a ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained, but there are alternative
measures that serve as a proxy for ﬁnancial constraint, such as the value of collateral (e.g., land),
which we were not able to use in our empirical analysis because of data limitations. Addressing
these data limitations is important for future research.
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22Table 1: Mean and Standard Deviations of ∆τit for each year from 2000 to 2005
Year 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005
Mean of ∆τit -0.0028 -0.0059 -0.0035 0.0917 -0.0006 -0.0006
S.D. of ∆τit 0.0346 0.0356 0.0316 0.0307 0.0061 0.0062
No. of Observations 2108 2131 2101 2012 2052 2077
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Mean of τit 0.0182 0.0158 0.0145 0.1062 0.1064 0.1062
S.D. of τit 0.0360 0.0337 0.0323 0.0081 0.0085 0.0081
No. of Observations 2341 2374 2292 2242 2338 2267
Table 2: Eﬀective Tax Credit Rate and Past R&D Expenditure
RDi2002 <= p25 (p25,p50] (p50,p75] > p75
Mean of ∆τi2003 0.0736 0.0931 0.0968 0.1026
0.0021 0.0010 0.0009 0.0007
Notes. The row designated by Mean of ∆i2003 reports the sample average of the change in the eﬀective tax
credit rate in the benchmark sample for 2003 conditional on the reference level for tax credit, RDi2002, in the
2002 incremental tax credit system. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3: Mean of τit in 2002 and Past R&D experience
Past R&D experience (1) zero year (2) one year (3) two years (4) three years
Mean of τit 0.1500 0.0652 0.0315 0.0104
S.D. of τit 0.0000 0.0620 0.0462 0.0237
No. of Observations 31 41 104 2111
23Table 4: Benchmark Sample Selection
Observations Remaining
deleted observations
Original sample (manufacturing, 1991, 1994–2007) 204091
Small or medium ﬁrms 126800 77291
Accounting year closed not in March 26003 51288
Missing past R&D 11744 39544
Sample for Table 1-3, 5 39547
Original sample (manufacturing, 1991, 1994–2007) 204091
Year other than 2003 191431 12660
Small or medium ﬁrms 7591 5069
Accounting year closed not in March 1428 3641
Missing past R&D in 2002 or 2003 556 3085
Missing/zero R&D in 2002 or 2003 1040 2045
Missing eﬀective tax credit rate in 2002 or 2003 33 2012
Benchmark Sample for Column (1) of Table 6 2012
Benchmark Sample for Column (1) of Table 6 2012
Missing debt-to-asset ratio in 2002 or 2003 104 1908
Benchmark Sample for Column (2) of Table 6 1908
Notes. ‘Small or medium ﬁrms’ exclude observations of ﬁrms with capital smaller than or equal to 100 million.
For each year, ‘missing past R&D’ excludes observations with more than two years of missing R&D expenditures
in the ﬁve years prior to the given year.
24Table 5: Mean Characteristics of Sample
2001 2002 2003 2004
Sales (Y) 51476.78 53191.27 56468.82 58291.98
Net Proﬁt -134.79 684.71 1250.60 1533.76
# Employee (N) 903.81 878.36 909.51 897.81
Fixed Asset (K) 71851.97 69074.05 65674.43 61108.93
Debt (b) 36704.31 35101.80 35379.58 35120.36
b/K 0.8119 0.7826 0.9874 1.0510
R&D Expenditure 2331.98 2315.35 2445.58 2460.50
R&D Exp./Y 0.0281 0.0272 0.0266 0.0260
R&D Exp./N 1.1588 1.1918 1.2280 1.2570
Positive R&D 0.7008 0.6939 0.6915 0.7001
Observation 3442 3349 3290 3391
Notes. Each entry except for the last row refers to the average of the corresponding variable in the benchmark
sample. The last row reports the number of observations. Rows designated as ‘R&D Exp./Y’ and ‘R&D Exp./N’
report averages of the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales and that to the number of employees, respectively. For
those rows, the sample is restricted to the observations with strictly positive R&D expenditure. ‘Fixed Asset’
refers to the tangible ﬁxed asset in the beginning of the period. ‘Debt’ refers to the sum of liquid and ﬁxed debts
in the beginning of the period. ‘Positive R&D’ refers to the fraction of observations with a strictly positive R&D
expenditure. All monetary values are nominal and in units of million yen.
Table 6: Regression Results (t = 2003)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit
SAMPLE Benchmark Benchmark Small K Small K Large K Large K
∆τit 2.0524*** 2.0171*** 2.9189*** 2.8077*** 1.1609 0.9846
[0.596] [0.623] [0.766] [0.767] [1.072] [1.125]
∆lnYit 0.4728*** 0.5144*** 0.3198 0.4182** 0.6242*** 0.5885***
[0.129] [0.105] [0.234] [0.191] [0.096] [0.102]
∆ bit










Constant -0.1916*** -0.2053*** -0.2283*** -0.2426*** -0.1391 -0.1435
[0.059] [0.061] [0.070] [0.069] [0.109] [0.112]
Observations 2,012 1,908 797 770 1,173 1,138
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regression equations are given by equations (7) and (9). The ﬁrst
diﬀerence is taken between 2002 and 2003. Robust standard errors are in brackets.
25Table 7: Tax Credit Elasticity by percentiles of bit/Kit (t = 2003)
5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%
bit
Kit 0.1807 0.2301 0.3554 0.5236 0.7813 1.1780 1.7204
ˆ β + ˆ θ bit
Kit 2.0556 2.0766 2.0766 2.1048 2.1480 2.2144 2.3053
Notes. The row of bit=Kit reports the value of debt-to-asset ratios at the 5th, 10th, ... , and 95th percentiles,
and the last row reports the estimated tax credit elasticities at these percentiles using the estimates in column
(2) of Table 6.
Table 8: Counterfactual Experiment (t = 2003)
Change in RDit (%)
Aggregate -18.40%
Average -18.06%
Average (bit/Kit ≤ p10) -17.91%
Average (bit/Kit ≥ p90) -19.33%
Notes. The row designated by ”Aggregate” reports a percentage change between the sum of the predicted value
of RDit based on the actual data and the sum of the predicted value of RDit based on the counterfactual data
on it without the 2003 tax credit reform for the sample used in column (2) of Table 6. The rows designated by
”Average,” ”Average (bit=Kit  p10),” and ”Average (bit=Kit  p90)” report the average percentage change in
predicted RDit for the sample used in column (2) of Table 6, that for the subsample with bit=Kit smaller than
its 10th percentile value, and that for the subsample with bit=Kit greater than its 90th percentile.
Table 9: Heckman Two-Step Estimation (t = 2003)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit
SAMPLE Benchmark Benchmark Small K Small K Large K Large K
∆τit 2.6094*** 2.6673*** 3.4225*** 3.3120*** 1.6148** 1.8045**
[0.499] [0.525] [0.817] [0.824] [0.649] [0.724]
∆lnYit 0.4778*** 0.5199*** 0.3239** 0.4246*** 0.6343*** 0.6015***
[0.084] [0.090] [0.146] [0.155] [0.101] [0.106]
∆ bit










ˆ λit 0.1220** 0.1367*** 0.1043 0.1025 0.1254* 0.2011***
[0.048] [0.052] [0.079] [0.079] [0.071] [0.075]
Constant -0.2722*** -0.2964*** -0.3046*** -0.3187*** -0.2047*** -0.2552***
[0.054] [0.057] [0.090] [0.091] [0.070] [0.073]
Observations 3,052 2,876 1,490 1,446 1,479 1,430
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The ﬁrst diﬀerence is taken between 2002 and 2003.
26Table 10: GMM Estimation (t = 2003)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit
SAMPLE Benchmark Benchmark Small K Small K Large K Large K
∆τit 2.0202 0.6009 4.4285 1.7168 0.6153 1.3098
[1.9711] [1.8934] [3.5305] [3.3123] [1.8601] [1.7374]
∆lnYit 0.6087*** 0.5698*** 0.6353*** 0.5499*** 0.5871*** 0.5914***
[0.1045] [0.1019] [0.2074] [0.1977] [0.0953] [0.0985]
∆ bit










Constant −0.2038 −0.0822 −0.3943 −0.1630 −0.0877 −0.1301
[0.1900] [0.1822] [0.3285] [0.3072] [0.1840] [0.1674]
p-value of the test of 0.7127 0.1916 0.3692 0.1365 0.3064 0.5957
over-identifying restriction
Observations 1725 1722 671 670 1052 1052
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Instruments are: col.(1), col.(3), col.(5): ∆lnYit, it 2, it 3,
RDit 2
Kit 2 ,











Robust standard errors are in brackets.
27Table 11: GMM Estimation (t = 2000 − 2003)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit
SAMPLE Benchmark Benchmark Small K Small K Large K Large K
∆τit 3.3583 ∗ ∗ 2.6282∗ 3.3319 3.3309 1.8649 2.0539
[1.5405] [1.4954] [2.4418] [2.3279] [1.7938] [1.8017]
∆lnYit 0.4398 ∗ ∗∗ 0.4359 ∗ ∗∗ 0.4075 ∗ ∗∗ 0.3890 ∗ ∗∗ 0.4847 ∗ ∗∗ 0.4839 ∗ ∗∗
[0.0555] [0.0556] [0.0903] [0.0890] [0.0610] [0.0614]
∆ bit








0.2260 ∗ ∗∗ 0.2208 ∗ ∗∗ −1.0320
[0.0137] [0.0156] [0.6347]
Y ear2001 0.0357∗ 0.0391∗ 0.0140 0.0146 0.0551 ∗ ∗ 0.0425
[0.0197] [0.0205] [0.0393] [0.0412] [0.0216] [0.0278]
Y ear2002 −0.0238 −0.0214 −0.0503 −0.0505 −0.0023 −0.0041
[0.0204] [0.0205] [0.0416] [0.0416] [0.0212] [0.0213]
Y ear2003 −0.3054 ∗ ∗ −0.2523∗ −0.2769 −0.3008 −0.1774 −0.1429
[0.1510] [0.1467] [0.2333] [0.2225] [0.1786] [0.1777]
Constant −0.0203 −0.0213 −0.0089 −0.0081 −0.0302 ∗ ∗ −0.0289∗
[0.0138] [0.0140] [0.0284] [0.0284] [0.0149] [0.0150]
p-value of the test of 0.0997 0.1181 0.1744 0.2102 0.4539 0.6836
over-identifying restriction
Observations 7057 7040 2694 2691 4350 4349
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Instruments are: col.(1), col.(3), col.(5): Y ear2001, Y ear2002,
Y ear2003, ∆lnYit, it 2, it 3,
RDit 2











Kit 2, constant. Robust standard errors are in brack-
ets.
28Table 12: Regression Results (t = 2003, with cap and deferred tax credit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit
SAMPLE Benchmark Benchmark Small K Small K Large K Large K
∆τit -0.0465 -0.0850 0.6857 0.5646 -0.6338 -0.8896
[0.461] [0.475] [0.598] [0.586] [0.716] [0.797]
∆lnYit 0.4606*** 0.4958*** 0.3010 0.3716* 0.6277*** 0.5930***
[0.124] [0.106] [0.224] [0.194] [0.093] [0.101]
∆ bit










Constant 0.0008 -0.0103 -0.0254 -0.0364 0.0219 0.0177
[0.039] [0.040] [0.048] [0.047] [0.062] [0.063]
Observations 2,012 1,908 797 770 1,173 1,138
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regression equations are given by equations (7) and (9). The ﬁrst
diﬀerence is taken between 2002 and 2003. Robust standard errors are in brackets.
Table 13: Heckman Two-Step Estimation (t = 2003, with cap and deferred tax credit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit
SAMPLE Benchmark Benchmark Small K Small K Large K Large K
∆τit -0.0316 -0.0803 0.6125 0.4714 -0.5926 -0.7843
[0.358] [0.366] [0.638] [0.638] [0.413] [0.504]
∆lnYit 0.4605*** 0.4957*** 0.3011** 0.3722** 0.6292*** 0.5952***
[0.085] [0.090] [0.147] [0.156] [0.100] [0.106]
∆ bit










ˆ λit 0.0085 0.0026 -0.0325 -0.0402 0.0375 0.0818
[0.045] [0.048] [0.073] [0.073] [0.067] [0.070]
Constant -0.0024 -0.0113 -0.0098 -0.0170 0.0120 -0.0047
[0.035] [0.036] [0.064] [0.064] [0.040] [0.041]
Observations 3,052 2,876 1,490 1,446 1,479 1,430
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The ﬁrst diﬀerence is taken between 2002 and 2003. The tax credit cap
is imposed using the proxy for corporate tax paid.
29Table 14: GMM Estimation (t = 2003, with cap and deferred tax credit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit
SAMPLE Benchmark Benchmark Small K Small K Large K Large K
∆τit 0.5442 1.9591 5.0555 4.8976 0.9940 0.9574
[2.4861] [1.9866] [6.3352] [5.8363] [1.1786] [1.1699]
∆lnYit 0.5873 ∗ ∗∗ 0.5330 ∗ ∗∗ 0.5188 ∗ ∗ 0.4777 ∗ ∗ 0.5839 ∗ ∗∗ 0.5956 ∗ ∗∗
[0.1149] [0.1079] [0.2272] [0.2164] [0.0959] [0.1022]
∆ bit








0.2010 ∗ ∗∗ 0.1599 ∗ ∗ −0.7742
[0.0495] [0.0709] [1.1685]
Constant −0.0543 −0.1779 −0.3820 −0.3815 −0.1074 −0.0727
[0.2002] [0.1583] [0.5006] [0.4569] [0.0944] [0.1031]
p-value of the test of 0.5614 0.3803 0.2209 0.1695 0.5861 0.8066
over-identifying restriction
Observations 1725 1722 671 670 1052 1052
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Instruments are: col.(1), col.(3), col.(5): ∆lnYit, it 2, it 3,
RDit 2
Kit 2 ,











Robust standard errors are in brackets.
30Table 15: GMM Estimation (t = 2000 − 2003, with cap and deferred tax credit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit ∆lnRDit
SAMPLE Benchmark Benchmark Small K Small K Large K Large K
∆τit 1.7380 1.3179 1.4121 1.5991 0.6800 0.8619
[2.1067] [2.0788] [3.4716] [3.4165] [1.7779] [1.6581]
∆lnYit 0.4458 ∗ ∗∗ 0.4371 ∗ ∗∗ 0.4296 ∗ ∗∗ 0.4023 ∗ ∗∗ 0.4928 ∗ ∗∗ 0.5053 ∗ ∗∗
[0.0659] [0.0651] [0.1097] [0.1076] [0.0651] [0.0701]
∆ bit








0.2323 ∗ ∗∗ 0.2278 ∗ ∗∗ −2.1246
[0.0146] [0.0180] [2.2805]
Y ear2001 0.0399∗ 0.0421 ∗ ∗ 0.0177 0.0188 0.0559 ∗ ∗ 0.0469
[0.0204] [0.0213] [0.0411] [0.0432] [0.0223] [0.0293]
Y ear2002 −0.0232 −0.0217 −0.0525 −0.0533 −0.0015 −0.0019
[0.0213] [0.0213] [0.0439] [0.0437] [0.0218] [0.0220]
Y ear2003 −0.1198 −0.1001 −0.0751 −0.1098 −0.0494 0.0256
[0.1713] [0.1687] [0.2777] [0.2724] [0.1471] [0.2009]
Constant −0.0255∗ −0.0251∗ −0.0146 −0.0136 −0.0313 ∗ ∗ −0.0315 ∗ ∗
[0.0143] [0.0143] [0.0296] [0.0295] [0.0154] [0.0155]
p-value of the test of 0.1319 0.1769 0.4552 0.3372 0.2690 0.4248
over-identifying restriction
Observations 7057 7040 2694 2691 4350 4349
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Instruments are: col.(1), col.(3), col.(5): Y ear2001, Y ear2002,
Y ear2003, ∆lnYit, it 2, it 3,
RDit 2











Kit 2, constant. Robust standard errors are in brack-
ets.
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32Figure 4: R&D Investment Decision for Low Value of It−1
Figure 5: R&D Investment Decision for High Value of It−1
33Figure 6: R&D Investment Decision when I∗∗ < It−1 < I∗
34Appendix A: Data
This section explains how to construct the variables for our empirical analysis of the Basic
Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities (BSJ) data.
A.1 R&D Expenditure
Our measure of R&D expenditure is the sum of own and outsourced research and development
expenses.
A.2 Eﬀective tax credit rate
Following the tax credit formulas described in Section 3, we construct a measure for the eﬀective
tax credit rate, τit, deﬁned by (1) using the BSJ data on R&D expenditure and sales. For the
benchmark analysis, we do not consider that the credit is capped by a certain fraction (12 to
20 percent) of the corporate tax, because the data on corporate tax are not available in the
BSJ data set. We compute the tax credit under the incremental tax credit system (for, as an









i2002 represents ﬁrm i’s net R&D expenditure deﬁned by the sum of own and out-
sourced R&D expenditure net of the amount received in commissioned R&D projects, and
RD
net
i2002 represents the average of ﬁrm i’s three largest yearly net R&D expenditures over pre-
vious ﬁve years (1997 to 2001).16 Then, the eﬀective tax credit rate is
τi2002 = Xi2002/RDnet
i2002. (12)




where κ(x) = (0.2x + 0.1)I(x < 0.1) + 0.12I(x ≥ 0.1) and Y it denotes the average sales over
the previous 4 years including the current ﬁscal year (2000 to 2003). Note that, from 2003 to
2005, ﬁrms were able to choose between the old incremental tax credit system and the new total
tax credit system. To consider this choice, we take the maximum value between the tax credit
under the incremental system and the tax credit under the total system as our measure for the
16Note that newly established ﬁrms cannot apply for the R&D tax credit under the incremental tax credit
system in their ﬁrst year because data on past R&D expenditures are not available.





i2003 represents the tax credit under the incremental tax credit system with the tax credit
given by the formula (12) with (11) and τtotal
i2003 represents the tax credit under the total tax credit
system, which is given by (13).
We use an alternative measure of tax credit with the cap and the deferred tax credit in
Tables 12 to 15. To construct an alternative measure of tax credit from 2000 to 2002, we use the
diﬀerence between ordinary and net proﬁts as a proxy for corporate tax paid in the BSJ data
and re-compute the eﬀective tax credit rate following the formula described in Section 3. Note
that this measure is likely to contain substantial measurement errors because, for example, it
contains accounting depreciation and gains and losses from sales/revaluation of liquid and ﬁxed
assets in addition to corporate tax paid.
For the total tax credit system introduced in 2003, we construct an alternative measure of
tax credit as in the case of the 2000 to 2002 period, except that we take into account the deferred
tax credit that was introduced together with the total tax credit system. If a ﬁrm’s tax credit
exceeds 20% of the corporate tax paid in 2003, it can collect a tax credit only up to the capped
amount in 2003, but it can re-claim the remaining amount above the cap in the following year,
as long as the tax credit in 2004 does not exceed 20% of the corporate tax paid in 2004. We
take this rule into account by computing the tax credit in 2003 under perfect foresight using the
realized value of corporate tax paid and R&D expenditure in 2004 as
Xi2003 =

       
       
X∗
i2003 if 0.20Ti2003 ≥ X∗
i2003
0.20Ti2003 + (X∗
i2003 − 0.20Ti2003) if 0.20Ti2003 < X∗
i2003 and
X∗
i2003 − 0.20Ti2003 < 0.20Ti2004 − X∗
i2004
0.20Ti2003 + (0.20Ti2004 − X∗
i2004) if 0.20Ti2003 < X∗
i2003 and
X∗





i2003 with κ(x) deﬁned as above. As before, for 2003, we
take into account that ﬁrms can choose between the incremental and total tax credit system by
taking the maximum value between the tax credits under the two systems.
A.3 Debt (bit)
We use the book value of total debt, which is the sum of short- and long-term debts.
36A.4 Capital Stock (Kit)
We construct data on the nominal value of the beginning-of-period capital stock (Kit) by the
perpetual inventory method. For capital stock, we use data on the total tangible ﬁxed asset
consisting of building, structure, machinery, transportation equipment, and land, which is the
only variable consistently available over the sample period in the BSJ data. The detailed pro-
cedure of the perpetual inventory method is as follows. First, we compute nominal investment
(Iit) by Iit = Kbook
it −Kbook
it−1 +ADit, where Kbook
it represents the book value of the tangible ﬁxed
asset at the end of period t and ADit represents accounting depreciation on the tangible ﬁxed
asset in period t. Second, we deﬂate the nominal investment data by the Corporate Goods
Price Index (CGPI) for capital goods. Third, we construct data on the real capital stock series
by Kreal
it = (1 − δ)Kreal
it−1 + Ireal
it , where δ represents the depreciation rate and Ireal
it and Kreal
it
represent real investment and real capital stock at the end of the period, respectively. For the
initial value of capital stock, we take data on the deﬂated book value of the ﬁxed asset at the
end of 1994 (or in the year of the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst appearance in the BSJ survey).17 We set δ to
0.05, which is the weighted average of the depreciation rates of the ﬁxed assets with the share
of each asset as weight. The depreciation rates for tangible ﬁxed assets are taken from Hayashi
and Inoue (1991). Because the BSJ survey does not provide data on tangible ﬁxed assets at its
component level, we compute the share of each ﬁxed asset using other corporate ﬁnance data
compiled by the Development Bank of Japan (DBJ).18 Finally, we compute the nominal value of
the capital stock using, again, the CGPI for capital goods and refer to the end-of-period capital
stock in period t − 1 as the beginning-of-period capital stock in period t.
Because of the inﬂation in the 1980s, the book value of capital stock in 1995 is likely to be
lower than the nominal value of the corresponding capital stock, thus understating the initial
capital stock in the perpetual inventory method. In fact, with the constructed data on Kit, the
mean and median debt-asset ratios (bit/Kit) are much larger than those for a similar sample of
the large manufacturing ﬁrms in the DBJ data: the mean and median bit/Kit are 2.76 and 1.37
in the BSJ data, while they are 1.20 and 0.36 in the DBJ data, respectively. Note that the DBJ
dataset provides a more reliable estimate of the capital stock because it starts in 1969.19 To
correct the undervaluation in the BSJ data, we multiply the book value of capital stock by 5 so
that the mean and median debt-asset ratios in the BSJ data become comparable to those in the
DBJ data. With this adjustment, the mean and the median debt-asset ratios become 0.91 and
0.45, respectively.
17Recall that the BSJ survey has been conducted yearly since 1995.
18The DBJ dataset provides detailed balance sheet information for Japanese ﬁrms listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange.
19The DBJ data are available from 1956. However, detailed data on accounting depreciation were not available
until 1969.
37Appendix B: Selection equation
Consider a selection indicator si that is equal to one if RDit > 0 for both t = 2002 and t = 2003
and is equal to zero otherwise. We collect the regressors and their coeﬃcients into vectors as
∆Xit = (1,∆τ′
it,∆lnYit,∆(bit/Kit),∆(τit(bit/Kit)))′ and α = (∆ηt,β,γ,δ,θ)′, respectively, so
that we write equation (7) as ∆lnRDit = ∆X′
itα+∆ϵit. The OLS estimator using the selected
sample with si = 1 is inconsistent when E[∆ϵit∆Xit|si = 1] ̸= 0. To control for selection bias,
we consider a probit selection equation (10). We assume that (i) (∆ϵi,vi) is independent of Zi
and ∆Xit with mean zero, (ii) vi ∼ N(0,1), and (iii) E[∆ϵi|vi] = ρvi. Under these assumptions,
we can consistently estimate (ψ,α,ρ) by ﬁrst obtaining an estimate of ψ by estimating a probit
equation (10) and then estimating ∆lnRDit = ∆X′
itα + ρˆ λi + ξit by the OLS. The standard
errors for α and ρ can be computed while taking into account the sampling errors from the ﬁrst
step estimator ˆ ψ.
Because the selection indicator si reﬂects a ﬁrm’s decision to participate in R&D activ-
ity in 2002 and 2003, we choose the observed variables that may aﬀect a ﬁrm’s participation
decision for R&D activity in 2002 and 2003. Speciﬁcally, when we estimate (9) with the selec-
tion equation (10), we choose Zi = (1,lnYi2002,lnYi2003,bi2002/Ki2002,bi2003/Ki2003,I(RDi2000 >
0),I(RDi2001 > 0))′. The variables lnYit and bit/Kit for t = 2002 and 2003 capture the ﬁrm’s
ability to conduct R&D activity and the ﬁrm’s ability to ﬁnance R&D activity, respectively,
in 2002 and 2003, while the dummy variables I(RDi2000 > 0) and I(RDi2001 > 0) may aﬀect
a ﬁrm’s decision to participate in R&D activity in 2002 and 2003, especially if there exists a
start-up cost of R&D activity. Note that the level variables lnYit and bit/Kit for t = 2002
and 2003 contain additional information that is not contained in the ﬁrst-diﬀerence variables
∆lnYi2003 and ∆(bi2003/Ki2003) in (8) because taking the ﬁrst diﬀerence eliminates the perma-
nent component contained in the level variables, providing exclusion restrictions for identifying
the selection equation.
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